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The present study on insight is based on an integration of Kaplan and Simon’s (1990) 
information processing theory of insight, a cognitive style theory, and achievement 
motivation theory. The style theory is the Assimilator (rule oriented, familiarity seeking) 
- Explorer (novelty seeking, explorative) styles (Kaufmann, 1979). Our hypothesis was 
that the effectiveness of two types of search constraints (prior experience and solution 
hints) for solving insight problems is moderated by both cognitive style and achievement 
needs, and depending on optimal levels of achievement motivation for different task 
conditions. We tested the hypothesis in a randomized experiment in which three levels 
of achievement needs and one type of search constraint (solution hints were available or 
not available) were experimentally manipulated. In addition participants completed a 
cognitive style test, a measure of prior problem-solving experience (the second type of 
search constraint), and controls for intelligence. There were 476 participants (the mean 
age was 18.4 years). Results revealed two similar and significant three-way interactions 
between styles, achievement needs, and the two types of search constraints. The pattern 
of interaction supported the idea that stylistic competence for the task characteristics 
(with and without search constraints available), when combined with manipulated 
achievement needs, predicted performance in counterintuitive ways but in line with the 
classic achievement motivation theory. With appropriate stylistic competence for the 
task characteristics elevated achievement needs led to poorer performance. With less 
appropriate stylistic competence, performance improved with increasing motivation. 
Implications for information processing theory are discussed. 
Keywords: cognitive style, insight, achievement motivation, information processing 
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This study examines how individual differences in cognitive style and 
achievement needs moderate the effects of search constraints on solving insight 
problems. Insight problems present the subject with a seemingly familiar situation. The 
initial understanding of the problem as familiar, however, typically leads to an impasse, 
which demands that the subject restructure his or her understanding of the situation. The 
new understanding should then pave the way for a novel solution, which is associated 
with the insightful “aha” experience. Solving these problems includes an extensive 
search for solutions in large problem spaces and typically also a search for the 
appropriate problem space. The role of search constraints such as experience and 
solution hints has been considered particularly important because these constraints 
reduce problem solvers’ search for a correct solution in large problem spaces and 
facilitate insight (Kaplan & Simon, 1990).  
The process of insight has been linked to scientific discovery (Finke, 1995) and 
creative problem solving (Kaufmann, 1979), while lack of insight has been linked to the 
costs of expertise (Wiley, 1998). Research on insight has developed over several decades 
and mainly through a cognitive problem-solving perspective (see, for example, Bowden, 
Jung-Beeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005; Jones, 2003; Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2004; 
Saugstad & Raaheim, 1960; Wertheimer, 1959). Beyond this, it is noteworthy that, with 
the exception of abilities, individual difference constructs have rarely been taken into 
account, although it seems supported that problem solving tasks can be approached in 
different ways (Fleck, &Weisberg, 2013). Moreover, motivation has scarcely been 
treated in this area. To fill in some of these gaps, this study examines how one aspect of 
individual differences, that is the Assimilator–Explorer (A–E) cognitive styles 
(Kaufmann, 1979), interacts with a motivational construct, achievement needs 
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(Atkinson, 1974a), and search constraints such as solution hints and degree of prior 
experience (Kaplan & Simon, 1990) when solving insight problems.  
While information processing-, achievement motivation-, and cognitive style 
theories are not new, the present integration is new. On the basis of the integrated 
theoretical framework outlined below, we hypothesized a three-way interaction on 
insight. We tested the hypotheses in a randomized experiment in which cognitive style 
interacted with achievement needs and solution hints. Three different levels of 
achievement needs were experimentally induced and the availability of solution hints 
was also experimentally varied. In a second, and similar, three way interaction 
hypothesis, we included a measure of prior problem-solving experience and replaced 
solution hints with prior experience. We tested the interaction between cognitive style, 
achievement needs, and prior experience. Thus, we tested two three-way interactions that 
were based on two different types of search constraints. 
The Assimilator–Explorer Theory of Cognitive Style 
 Recent research has found that insight problems become difficult to solve because 
problem solvers are often bounded by their heuristics and automatic rule-based cognition 
(e.g., Kahneman & Klein, 2009; Simon, 1987). Although heuristic thinking may be highly 
efficient (Gigerenzer, 1999), it may also narrow search and blind the problem solver to 
other possibilities (Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In this respect, the A-
E cognitive style framework posits that there are individual differences in natural 
inclinations to use such rule-based, familiarity-seeking strategies.  
Kaufmann (1979) found that some individuals were able to restructure and find a 
new approach to solve an insight task whereas others seemed bounded by experience and 
unable to restructure and solve the problem. On the basis of this finding, the A–E inventory 
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was later developed and revised (Kaufmann, 1989; Kaufmann & Martinsen, 1992). This 
inventory measures a continuum of cognitive styles, with relatively stable tendencies to 
use rule-oriented and familiarity-seeking strategies at one end and tendencies to explore 
new types of procedures and solutions at the other end (Kaufmann, 1995; Martinsen & 
Kaufmann, 2000). In their style taxonomy, Riding and Raynor (1998) placed the A–E 
theory in the Wholist–Analyst category of style constructs along with related style 
theories, among them the theory of Adaptors and Innovators (Kirton, 1976). 
As regards the validity of the A–E construct, the main point is of course to which 
extent the measure of the construct measures what the theory describes (Nunnally & 
Bernstein, 1994). Since validation is multifaceted (Messick, 1995), it is important to 
consider reliability, theoretically meaningful predictions, and convergent and discriminant 
validity. Several studies incorporating the above considerations have been done on the A–
E styles. In previous studies (Martinsen & Diseth, 2011; Martinsen & Kaufmann, 2000), 
the alpha reliabilities for the A–E inventory ranged from .83 to .92, and test-retest 
reliabilities over three weeks and three months ranged from .70 to .83 (Martinsen & 
Kaufmann, 2000). Sample items are provided in the Methods section, and the complete 
A–E inventory was published in Martinsen & Diseth (2011).  
A main idea of the A–E theory is that individuals with a strong inclination toward 
Assimilation apply what is known or familiar to them when solving problems (Kaufmann, 
1995; Martinsen & Kaufmann, 2000). Our use of Assimilation is based on Piaget’s (1976) 
definition of the term, which means interpreting stimuli in terms of existing schemes. In 
problem solving, such an approach can be useful or less useful depending on what kind of 
information is available in memory or in the situation. Thus, when facing insight problems, 
Assimilators should quickly encounter an impasse when task characteristics or information 
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stored in memory invite them to follow misleading rules or to apply less useful solution 
principles. That is, Assimilators should be vulnerable to constraints in the situation and/or 
in memory. On the other hand, because of their orientation toward following rules and 
doing what is familiar, Assimilators should perform better on tasks in which relevant 
experience, solution hints, or solution procedures are available. That is, Assimilators 
should perform well on insight tasks when search constraints are available.  
For those with a strong inclination toward Exploration, the ideal task environment 
would be one of high task novelty since Explorers enjoy going beyond existing rules and 
experimenting with new solutions. High novelty is the typical perception when individuals 
have lower levels of relevant experience or when there are no salient and facilitating rules 
or procedures in the task environment. Thus, Explorers should perform better when search 
constraints are not available since they excel in extensive search processes. Because of 
their specialized strategy use, they should perform relatively worse when the task requires 
utilizing existing rules and heuristics. These propositions can be tested by investigating 
performance on insight tasks under conditions of high and low levels of relevant 
experience and the presence or absence of search constraints. An Exploratory style would 
otherwise be better for insight problems and give a main effect for the A-E styles given 
the high novelty associated with insight tasks. 
Two previous studies on insight have supported the central hypothesis that those 
with low scores on the A–E inventory (Assimilators) should perform better than those with 
high scores (Explorers) when task-relevant experience is in the higher range. In both 
studies (Martinsen, 1993, 1995a) the same measure of previous experience was used to 
describe participants’ task-relevant experience, defined as experience with mind-
stretchers, drawing/painting, jigsaw puzzles, technical drawing, and more. In the first 
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study, practical construction insight problems were included, and in the second, 
mathematical insight problems were used. In both studies, results revealed interactions 
between prior experience and the A–E styles on insight. The interactions showed that 
Assimilators generally performed better than Explorers under conditions of high 
experience whereas Explorers performed better when task-relevant experience was low, 
implying high perceived novelty in the task. Thus, a core idea in the A–E theory was 
supported and replicated across different types of insight tasks. Assimilators were better 
at using search constraints and Explorers were better at coping with high novelty. As 
further support for the idea that the A–E styles are associated with novelty seeking, 
Martinsen and Diseth (2011) found that a group of technically oriented staff with 
registered patents had significantly higher scores on the A–E inventory compared with 
another group of technically oriented staff without registered patents. Finally, Martinsen 
and Furnham (in press) found that Explorers participated more frequently in creative 
activities. 
As regards other aspects of the A–E styles’ construct validity, these must be based 
on criteria that have been associated with the general concept of cognitive styles. For 
several styles (but not all), the main criteria are that styles should be “value free,”   they 
should be unrelated to cognitive abilities and should evolve around profiles of personality 
traits (Martinsen, 1997; Martinsen, Kaufmann, & Furnham, 2011). The latter position is 
not new, and Messick (1987) maintained that style could be seen either as a bridge between 
personality and cognition or as accumulated personality influences on specific aspects of 
cognition defined by the style theory in question. To be “value free” means that both poles 
of a style dimension should have some kind of advantage or merit. For the A–E styles, 
there is a prediction of good performance for both styles on insight tasks, and the 
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moderating conditions of high versus low levels of relevant experience illustrate the so-
called “value free” aspect of the styles. 
As regards the A–E styles and measures of cognitive abilities, a previous study 
(Martinsen & Kaufmann, 2000) included measures of crystalized, fluid, and spatial 
abilities. On the basis of a sample of 267 students, results showed that the A–E styles were 
independent of any of the intelligence measures. Bakken and Haerem (2010) also found 
lack of relationship between the A-E styles and fluid intelligence. In a study by Martinsen 
and Furnham (in press), there were low, but significant correlations between the A–E 
styles and measures of figural (.15) and verbal fluency (.14). Given these results, the idea 
has been supported that styles are not, or only weakly, related to cognitive abilities. 
When studying the relationship between the A–E styles and personality, stronger 
and multiple relationships should be expected. In this regard, the relationship to the five-
factor model is particularly important. Martinsen and Diseth (2011) found positive 
correlations between the A–E styles and Openness (O) and Extroversion (E), and negative 
correlations with Neuroticism (N), Agreeableness (A), and Conscientiousness (C). 
Assimilation was associated with higher scores on N, A, and C, while Exploration was 
associated with higher scores on O and E. In this respect, Digman (1997) showed that 
correlations between N, A, and C made up a second-order factor above the five-factor 
model, which was called “getting along.” Moreover, correlations between O and E made 
up another second-order factor, which was called “getting ahead.” The correlational 
pattern between the five factors making up the two higher-order factors appears the same 
as the correlations between the five factors and the A–E styles. Thus, it seems possible that 
the A–E styles have evolved around the two second-order factors in the five-factor model 
and that Assimilation is associated with a tendency to “get along,” hence the familiarity 
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orientation and rule-oriented strategy use. Exploration seems associated with a tendency 
to “get ahead,” hence the exploratory orientation and novelty-seeking strategy use.  
It should be noted that the related theory of Adaption Versus Innovation (Kirton, 
1976) was recently criticized for being too strongly correlated with the five-factor model, 
and R2 was found to be .50 or higher, depending on the analyses (von Wittich & Antonakis, 
2011). First, the five-factor model seems to explain less variance (38%) in the A–E styles 
(Martinsen & Diseth, 2011). Second, and as noted above, a relatively strong style–
personality relationship can be considered as theoretically meaningfull. Relatively strong 
style-personality relationships has been found for other style constructs also (Pacini & 
Epstein, 1999). Third, using a single-style measure can indeed be useful in the study of 
cognition since it facilitates a more parsimonious approach than what would otherwise be 
possible when alternatively investigating a complex interplay between several personality 
traits in combination with other task parameters such as search constraints on cognition. 
This type of approach could, for example, invite five-, six-, and even seven-way 
interactions in the present context, which, of course, would not be possible to interpret. 
Other relevant correlates of the A–E styles (Martinsen & Kaufmann, 2000) are 
positive correlations with autonomy orientation (Deci & Ryan, 1985) and the 
achievement motive (McClelland et. al, 1953), and negative correlations with 
impersonal orientation (Deci & Ryan, 1985) and fear of failure (McClelland, 1985). 
Moreover, Diseth and Martinsen (2003) found that the A–E styles loaded on a factor 
along with Need for Cognition (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984), the Deep approach to 
learning (Entwistle, 1997), and the achievement motive. They loaded negatively on 
another factor with the Strategic approach to learning (Entwistle, 1997). Bakken and 
Haerem (2010) found a correlation with the intuitive style (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). 
An Integrated Perspective on Insight  10 
 
 
Martinsen and Kaufmann (2000) found no correlation between the A–E styles and 
social desirability. 
Based on the results above, and to conclude, we believe that the A–E styles 
represent a valid measure of cognitive style and that this construct has important 
implications for information processing in combination with other influences. Since 
validation is a continuous process (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955) the predictions and tests in 
this study can also be seen as a contribution to the nomological validity of the A–E 
construct. 
The Present Study 
Insight problems are ill-defined, novel, and complex tasks (Kaplan & Simon, 
1990). In an important addendum to information processing theory, Kaplan and Simon 
(1990) argued that a major source of difficulty in insight problems is the need for 
extensive search processes in large and appropriate problem spaces. They maintained 
that availability of search constraints, operationalized as, for example, cues in the 
situation, previous experience or solution hints, facilitate such search processes. The term 
search constraint is different from other uses of the term constraint in the study of 
insight. A search constraint is information that may limit or reduce search in large 
problem spaces (Kaplan & Simon, 1990) and that facilitates finding a solution. Several 
studies have supported the idea that search constraints facilitate the solution of insight 
tasks (for example, Cushen, & Wiley, 2012; Hattori, Sloman, & Orita, 2013). Other uses 
of the term constraint (Knoblich, Ohlsson, Haider, & Rhenius, 1999; Ohlsson, 1992; 
Patrick et. al, 2015) describe a limitation on appropriate understanding of the problem 
situation. Such types of constraints are detrimental to finding solutions. We use the term 
search constraint as defined by Kaplan and Simon (1990).  
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The A-E styles as a component in the classic theory of achievement motivation. 
Above, we presented evidence that the A–E styles describe task-specific competence in 
handling search constraints such as prior experience and high novelty. Since the A–E 
styles describe task competence, it can be included in motivational theories in which task 
competence is an essential part of the motivational system. One such theory is the theory 
of achievement motivation (Atkinson, 1974; McClelland, 1985). In this theory, task 
competence is emphasized through the theoretical component perceived probability of 
success and posited to influence resultant (total) motivation together with the incentive 
value associated with success and the strength of motive arousal (Dickhäuser & Reinard, 
2006; McClelland, 1985; Weiner, 1992). It is noteworthy that more recent theories have 
also defined competence as a core element in task motivation (Bandura, 1997; Durik, 
Vida, & Eccles, 2006; Eccles & Wigfield, 2002; Elliot & Dweck, 2005).  
Atkinson (1974a) developed a set of formulas to facilitate formulations of 
hypotheses in achievement motivation theory. The level of total or resultant motivation 
(Tr) was inferred from theory instead of being measured. Typically, resultant 
motivation (Tr) has been studied in terms of choice of task difficulty, task performance, 
or task behavior (McClelland, 1985).  
The simplified formula for resultant motivation is Tr = (Ms - Mf) * Ps * (1 - Ps) 
(see Atkinson [1974a] or Rand, Lens, and Decock [1991, p. 15] for the derivation of this 
formula). Here, Ms is the achievement motive and Mf is fear of failure. Motive strength 
(Ms - Mf) can be individually measured by inventories or manipulated in experimental 
settings through written achievement instructions (McClelland, 1985). In the present 
context, motive strength is manipulated experimentally. 
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 The probability of success (Ps) is determined by the perceived competence for 
the task. (1 - Ps) is the incentive value of success and is oppositely proportional to the 
probability of success. Based on this, the combination of Ps * (1 - Ps) together reflects 
competence motivation.  
In achievement motivation theory, Ps-values have a scale from .00–1.00, where 
.00 represents low probability of success (or no available competence for the task) and 
1.00 represents high probability for success (or high competence for the task). It can be 
shown that maximum competence motivation occurs when probability of success is .50 
(Atkinson, 1974a).  
Previous research has demonstrated that competence as intellective ability can 
be used as an indicator of the probability of success in academic tasks (Gjesme, 1973; 
Rand & Rand, 1979). However, we expand on this position as regards insight with our 
claim that the probability of success (Ps) must be related to both of the following 
characteristics in the individual and the task environment: the availability of search 
constraints and competence in utilizing such constraints. Above, we  discussed how the 
A–E styles describe competence in utilizing search constraints. Clearly, Assimilators 
perform better when search constraints are present, and consequently, the probability of 
success (Ps) is higher for them when such constraints are present. Explorers perform 
better when search constraints are not present, and consequently, the probability of 
success (Ps) is higher for them when such constraints are not present. Therefore, the 
two poles of cognitive style represent indicators of different Ps in different task 
environments.  
This means that when determining the resultant motivation associated with a 
task, stylistic competence must be included as a part of task competence. This also 
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implies that effects of stylistic competence on motivation will depend on whether 
search constraints are available or not. Thus, when considering the phenomenon of 
insight, resultant motivation (Tr) can be specified as a function of motive strength (Ms 
- Mf), whereas Ps can be specified as a function of high versus low style scores 
(Assimilation/Exploration),  task characteristics (availability of search constraints), 
and, finally, the incentive value associated with success (1 - Ps).  
As a basis for our further predictions, we underline that insight problems are 
difficult tasks with low solution frequencies (Kershaw & Ohlsson, 2014). Because of 
this, it is natural to expect  the average probability of success on insight tasks to be 
low. Researchers have found that insight problems, such as the nine-dot problem, or the 
hat rack problem and the two-string problem that we use in the experiment below, have 
solution frequencies in the .25–.30 range when average scores across several such tasks 
are included in the dependent variable (Maier, 1970; Raaheim, 1984; Kershaw & 
Ohlsson, 2014). In addition to this, we expect a general positive effect on the Ps value 
when search constraints are present (Kaplan & Simon, 1990). This means that tasks in 
general should be perceived as a little easier when such constraints are present and that 
this perception should correspond to a main effect of search constraints on 
performance.  
In Table 1 below, we have used our adapted theory of achievement motivation to 
make estimations of outcomes. Here it seems that Assimilators are closer to the level of 
maximum competence motivation (.25) when search constraints are available (they have 
Ps * incentive value = .24).  Explorers also have a strength of motivation (Ps * incentive 
value = .21) closer to the level of maximum competence motivation when search 
constraints are not available. It should be emphasized that Table 1 has been constructed 
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for illustrative purposes to assist the understanding of the presented theory. The figures 
in the table should be considered illustrative as well. 
Before we proceed, however, another important question must be answered: How 
does the level of resultant motivation relate to performance on insight tasks, and is there 
actually an optimal level of motivation for insight tasks? 
Optimal strength of resultant achievement motivation and insight. Everyday 
thinking would imply that the stronger the motivation, the better the performance, 
especially on complex and difficult tasks. However, within achievement motivation 
theory and related areas, this has not been a standard prediction. On the contrary, the 
optimal-level-of-motivation-for-the-task hypothesis in achievement motivation theory 
claims that there are different optimal levels of resultant motivation for tasks along a 
simplicity–complexity continuum (Atkinson, 1974b). A moderate-to-low level of total 
motivation should facilitate performance on extremely difficult and complex tasks such 
as insight problems. This proposition is based on the inverted U-shaped distribution for 
the relationship between arousal and performance on complex tasks originally put 
forward by Yerkes and Dodson (1908).  
Easterbrook’s (1958) cue-utilization theory has been proposed as a possible 
explanation of the inverted U-shaped relationship; Easterbrook argued that high levels 
of arousal should lead to restriction of the amount of information that can be processed, 
which would be detrimental for complex tasks. However, the arousal concept in this 
theory has been questioned (Hanoch & Vitouch, 2004), and another theory seeking to 
explain the Yerkes and Dodson (1908) law was proposed by Humphreys and Revelle 
(1984), who argued that short-term memory was negatively affected by high arousal 
and that this may cause negative performance effects on complex tasks. Although we 
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do not explicitly test the mechanisms involved in these theories, we take them as 
support for the proposition that complex and difficult tasks such as insight problems are 
better solved with a low level of resultant motivation. 
Moreover, there is abundant anecdotal evidence associating insights in science 
and art with what has been called the “bed-bus-bath” phenomenon (Boden, 1990). This 
means that the phenomenon of insight typically occurs under very relaxed conditions. 
Boden provided several examples of it (p. 15), such as Archimedes having the idea of 
how to measure the volume of an irregularly shaped object when he was in the bath.  
In addition to anecdotal evidence, two classic experimental studies  showed 
detrimental effects of monetary incentives on insight problem performance. In the first, 
Glucksberg (1962) found negative effects of monetary rewards in Duncker’s candle 
problem. However, these negative effects  were not present in an easier version of the 
same problem. In the second study, McGraw and McCullers (1979) showed that 
monetary incentives impaired performance on a set-breaking task, but not on 
algorithmic, rule-oriented tasks. Thus, both these studies support the hypothesis that 
increased strength of motivation (drive) is detrimental to solving insight problems. 
Moreover, from other relevant perspectives, Ostafin & Kassman (2012) found that 
mindfullness facilitated insight, and Cao, Hitchman, Qiu, & Zhang (2015) in a study of 
brain states found that increased alpha power at parieto-occipital electrode sites was 
associated with increased performance on insight tasks and the authors associated this 
with defocused attention. 
Beyond these studies, and with high relevance for the present context, Martinsen 
(1994) found an interaction between the A–E styles and the motive to succeed on task 
performance. The dependent tasks were insight problems that are normally, without 
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taking into account availability of search constraints, in favor of the Explorer style task 
competence. In this study, a combination of high task competence (Explorer style) and a 
high level of  achievement motive led to the counterintuitive finding of impaired 
performance. High task competence (Explorers) in combination with a lower level of 
motive strength led to good performance on the selected insight tasks. The latter finding 
was interpreted as a result of too-high motivation for the task. On the other hand, lower 
levels of task competence (Assimilators) in combination with higher levels of motive 
strength led to good performance. This was interpreted as a result of optimal motivation. 
Similar findings were also obtained in another study (Kaufmann & Martinsen, 2006) 
when positive mood was manipulated, indicating a common mechanism for positive 
mood and achievement needs, where the latter describe anticipation of positive affect in 
achievement settings (McClelland et al., 1953). 
Another, and more recent, study (Martinsen & Furnham, 2015) was designed to 
test the same idea of optimal motivation for complex and difficult insight problems. This 
time the dependent tasks were designed as complex word pair tasks that involved finding 
a single word that would form a word pair with each of three given stimulus words 
(complex, structured RAT tasks). The dependent tasks here were considered to be in 
favor of the Assimilator style. Again, a significant interaction supported our theory that 
high competence and low levels of motive strength, or vice versa, would result in 
superior performance. Assimilators performed better with motive scores in the lower 
range, and Explorers performed better with motive scores in the higher range. 
On the basis of the above findings, we consider it a pertinent hypothesis that 
insight problems are better solved under conditions of low resultant motivation as 
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defined by the influences of task competence and task characteristics in combination 
with the strength of aroused achievement motive. 
Bringing it all together. In this study, we have posited a new theory based on an 
integration of three central psychological theories. To further illustrate our integration, 
we have extended the simplified formula for resultant motivation on the basis of our 
theory above by adding the interaction of the A–E cognitive styles and task 
characteristics to the achievement motivation equation:  
(Ms - Mf) * [PsCs * (1 - PsCs)] * Tc 
In this equation, (Ms-Mf) is achievement motive strength, PsCs - is the 
probability of success associated with high versus low style scores (Assimilation – 
Exploration), (1 – PsCs) is the incentive value of success for the style in question, and 
Tc- describes task characteristics/availability of search constraints – no availability of 
search constraints. We have used this equation to show the estimation of resultant 
motivation and performance implications in Table 1. 
____________________________ 
Insert Table 1 about here 
____________________________ 
 When we integrate what is discussed above about the A–E style competencies, 
availability of task constraints, and motivation, a three-way interaction hypothesis can 
be presented for each of our two types of included search constraints: 
 
H1: There is a three-way interaction between the A–E styles, motivation, and solution 
hints.  
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The direction of this interaction should be as follows: In the hint condition, 
Assimilators should have an overall decrease in performance as a consequence of the 
motivation-arousing experimental conditions, while Explorers should have an overall 
increase in performance because of the experimental motivation conditions. In the no-
hint condition, this pattern of interaction should be opposite to the pattern of interaction 
in the hint condition: When their motivation increases, Explorers should decrease their 
performance, while Assimilators should increase their performance when motivation 
increases. 
A similar hypothesis was formulated for our second search constraint, prior 
experience: 
 
H2: There is a three-way interaction between the A–E styles, motivation, and the level 
of previous problem-solving experience.  
The direction of this interaction should be as follows: When experience is high, 
Assimilators should have an overall decrease in performance as a consequence of the 
experimental motivation-arousing conditions, while Explorers should have an overall 
increase in performance because of the motivation conditions. When experience is low, 
this pattern of interaction should be opposite to the pattern of interaction when 
experience is high: When their motivation increases, Explorers should decrease their 
performance, while Assimilators should increase their performance when motivation 
increases.  
Method 
To test the hypotheses, we conducted a randomized experiment including 
manipulated motivation, two kinds of search constraints, and the A–E styles. We used 
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three written experimental achievement instructions (low, medium, and high) to 
manipulate the degree of motive strength (McClelland, Atkinson, Clark, & Lowell, 
1953). Such instructions have been validated as manipulations of the need for 
achievement motive, and have been used to manipulate the level of motivation in a 
number of studies (McClelland, 1985). Our three achievement instructions were 
designed on the basis of the traditional procedure for such instructions. As search 
constraints, we included both a measure of previous problem-solving experience and 
experimentally varied solution hints.  
Controls for intelligence were included because intelligence is important for 
problem solving and insight (Ash & Wiley, 2006; Davidson, 1995; Gilhooly & Murphy, 
2005; Raaheim, 1984, 1988; Sternberg, 1985). Additionally, we included gender as a 
control variable since gender differences in earlier studies have had a significant effect 
on insight (e.g., Kaufmann & Martinsen, 2006), perhaps due to males having more 
experience with tools used in practical construction insight tasks. 
Finally, we included two post-treatment measures to exclude alternative 
interpretations of experimental manipulations and findings. The possibility of anxiety 
arousal was assumed to be greater under the achievement (high motivation condition) 
than under the other two conditions because of an emphasis on evaluation. We therefore 
included a measure of state anxiety from the State–Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 
1983). We also included a measure of intrinsic motivation because intrinsic motivation 
has been found to have a favorable effect on creativity and insight (e.g., Amabile, 1983, 
1996). The probability of arousing intrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1985) was 
assumed to be greater under the low motivation condition than under the other two 
conditions due to the low emphasis on evaluation and the nature of the dependent tasks. 
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Beyond the aforementioned measures, we are not aware of any measure that can directly 
assess resultant motivation, so we have not included any manipulation check for it. 
Achievement instructions to manipulate resultant motivation in previous research have 
been validated through scores from projective TAT protocols (McClelland, 1985), but 
such testing were not considered to be an acceptable manipulation check in the current 
context. 
Participants 
The participants were 476 students (298 females and 178 males) from senior high 
schools in Norway who volunteered to participate. The mean age was 18.4 years. 
Virtually all the students in the selected classes participated.  
Instruments 
A-E inventory. The revised 30-item A–E inventory (Kaufmann & Martinsen, 
1992) was used. The scale is continuous, and Explorers have high scores and 
Assimilators low scores. Each item has a 5-point response scale. The coefficient alpha 
was .88, in line with previous studies using the inventory (e.g., Martinsen & Diseth, 
2011; Martinsen & Kaufmann, 2000). Two sample items are: 
“I prefer situations in which you have to stick to options that are tried and true” 
(reversed scoring).  
“I quite like situations in which it is necessary to break with conventional 
wisdom.”  
 Cognitive abilities. Two measures of cognitive abilities were included. As a 
measure of crystallized intelligence, half the WAIS vocabulary (18 items; Wechsler, 
1955) was used. The subjects were given 10 minutes to complete this test. Coefficient 
alpha was .69. A 20-item standardized number series test (Mønnesland, 1985) was used 
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as a measure of fluid intelligence. Participants were given six minutes to complete this 
test. Coefficient alpha was .88. 
 Prior problem-solving experience. A questionnaire that was used in previous 
studies (Martinsen, 1993, 1995a) was included so that the availability of internal search 
constraints could be compared with the effects of external search constraints (solution 
hints). The items included questions about the subjects’ level of experience in six 
activities considered to be particularly relevant for solving insight problems (experience 
with mind-stretchers, drawing/painting, jigsaw puzzles, technical drawing, mathematical 
problem solving, problem solving in science tasks). Each item was rated on a 4-point 
frequency response scale that ranged from 0 to 3, and then the sum score was used. We 
considered this to be a formative measure since relatively independent activities were 
added to a composite measure of relevant experience for the present insight problems. 
Insight problems. Three classic insight problems were employed. Two tasks 
(the hat rack and two-string problems) were chosen  on the basis of their taxonomic 
classifications as insight and construction problems (Greeno, 1978; Weisberg, 1995), 
and the third problem (the ring problem; Raaheim, 1961) was chosen for its similarity 
with the hat rack and  two-string problems. 
In the two-string problem (Maier, 1970), the task is to tie together two strings 
that are hanging down from the ceiling. The strings are too far apart to be reached by 
simply stretching out both arms. In our version of this problem, the available tools were 
a cup, a screwdriver, and a box of thumbtacks. The correct solution is to tie one string 
or both strings to one of the tools (e.g., the cup), push the string into a pendulum move-
ment and to grab it when it comes within reach. Two points were given for this 
solution. Subjects were given one point for a good attempt at a solution, which was 
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defined as any effort that would bring at least one of the strings closer to the other 
without being held by the hands. In practice, one such solution would be to use  the 
thumbtacks  as a means to affix one or both strings to a wall to get them closer to each 
other. 
 In the hat rack problem (Maier, 1970), the task is to use two sticks and a C-
clamp to make a solid rack on which to hang a heavy coat. The correct solution is to 
wedge the sticks between the floor and the roof, or between two walls, with the C-
clamp tightened on the junction between the two sticks. The handle of the C-clamp 
functions as a peg. Two points were given for  this solution. Here subjects were also 
given one point for a good try, that is, for making a construction that was fairly, but not 
sufficiently, stable. In practice, such a solution would involve placing one stick  on the 
floor and attaching the other  vertically to its middle with the C-clamp tightened at the 
junction between them. 
 In the ring problem (Raaheim, 1961), the task is to get hold of a gold ring at the 
bottom of a narrow well that is three meters deep. It is so narrow and deep that it is 
impossible to reach the ring or dive for it. Subjects are told to use some tools that might 
be of help: a three-meter-long tube with the same diameter as the ring, a pair of 
scissors, a knife, a piece of wood, and a nail. The correct solution is to cut a wood plug, 
put it into one end of the tube, hammer the nail into the plug,  bend the nail into the 
shape of a hook, and finally to fish up the ring. This solution was given two points. One 
point was given for a good try, i.e.,  pressing one end of the pair of scissors into the 
tube and then  using the resulting (not completely satisfactory) hook to fish up the ring. 
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The average polychoric correlation for the three tasks was .22. The scores were 
used as a composite based on their taxonomic classification (Greeno, 1978; Weisberg, 
1995). Six minutes were allowed for each task. 
Post-treatment measures. As discussed above, a measure of state anxiety from 
the State–Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, 1983) was included. The alpha for this 
10-item measure was .89. A measure of interest was also included; we developed this 
measure  on the basis of theories of intrinsic motivation (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Harter, 
1990). The measure was used to check whether the low-motivation condition was more 
intrinsically motivating than the other two motivation conditions. The alpha for the 
interest measure was .86. 
Experimental Treatments 
 Achievement instructions. We formulated three instructions to create three 
different levels of achievement needs or motivation strength. The procedure were 
adapted based on principles developed by McClelland et al. (1953) (see also Atkinson & 
Birch, 1974). In the low-motivation condition, subjects were informed that the 
experimenter was  interested only in finding out whether the insight problems, presented 
as puzzle tasks and described as typical leisure-time activities, were interesting for this 
age group of students. The respondents were informed that whether they could actually 
solve the problems was not considered very important. They were also informed that the 
analyses of the answers would focus on the results for the several hundred participants 
in the study and not individual performances. The timing of the tasks was explained as 
necessary in order to create equal conditions. Finally,  subjects were informed that they 
were to answer a questionnaire about their level of task-related interest at the end of the 
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session. This control condition was considered to be relaxed. It was called the low-
motivation condition, or simply low in the following results section. 
In the medium-motivation condition, subjects were instructed to perform as well 
as they could (formulated as an imperative) on the set of problem-solving tasks, which 
were described as typically used in research, and within the time that was available. 
Subjects were then informed that they were to answer a questionnaire about their 
reactions to the dependent tasks at the end of the session. This was called the medium-
motivation condition, or simply medium in the following results section. 
Participants in the high-motivation condition were told that their performance on 
the problem-solving tasks would inform them about their level of ability and that they 
did not have much time available for each task. The selected tasks were described as 
frequently used by researchers in order to test certain abilities. Subjects were additionally 
told that at the end of the session, they were to fill in a questionnaire where they would 
evaluate their own performance. This was constructed to be a typical achievement 
condition called the high-motivation condition, or simply high in the following results 
section.  
Solution hints. Solution hints served as one type of search constraint, thus 
improving the structure of the dependent insight problems. Solution hints were tested in 
pilot studies, and hints that produced increased solution frequencies were selected for the 
present study. The hint for the two-string problem was: Can you in one way or another 
create a movement in one of the strings without holding it permanently? The hint for the 
hat rack problem was: Try if you can to also use the ceiling for your construction. The 
hint for the ring problem was: Try if you can to make a tool with a hook to fish out the 
ring. 
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Procedure 
The testing took place in groups in ordinary classrooms during school hours. The 
materials were presented in writing and administered by trained research assistants. The 
subjects volunteered and were debriefed and encouraged to ask questions at the end of 
the session.  
The A–E inventory, the experience questionnaire, and the vocabulary and number 
series tests were administered prior to the experimental treatments and the dependent 
tasks. After the task resolutions, the state measures of affects were administered. With 
reference to these measures, the subjects were asked to report their emotional states 
during the process of problem solving. In the motivation instructions, the subjects were 
informed about the number of problem-solving tasks and the time available for each (six 
minutes).  
The solution hints were administered to about half the participants in each of the 
three motivation conditions. The result was a three-by-two factorial design. The 
participants were randomly assigned to each of the six experimental conditions through 
prior random mixing of the booklets containing the written instructions and test 
materials. 
Results 
The variables were generally within the range of the normal distribution. 
Correlations, means, and standard deviations for the included variables can be seen in 
Table 2. 
_______________________________ 
Insert Table 2 about here 
________________________________ 
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A few missing data were handled by listwise deletion in each of the analyses 
below. The difference in performance in the hint versus the no-hint condition was 
significant (t (466) = 5.36, p = .000; hint: M = 3.29, SD = 1.59, no-hint: M = 2.49, SD = 
1.68). This indicated that availability of solution hints facilitated performance and thus 
that an anticipated main effect was obtained. As seen in Table 1, there was also a 
significant correlation between the measure of prior experience and performance (r = 
.12), indicating a main effect for the other search constraint as well. The general level of 
task difficulty can be further illustrated through the fact that only 8.5% received 5 points 
and 3.4 % received 6 points when hints were not provided. In the hint condition, 7.7% 
received 5 points and 10.3% received 6 points. 
To investigate any unintended effects of the experimental motivation 
instructions, the post-experimental measures of state anxiety and interest were used as 
dependent variables. The data were analyzed using regression analysis, where the 
experimental motivation instructions were coded as contrasts to represent an ordinal 
variable. They were coded as the difference (see Cohen & Cohen, 1983) between low 
and medium + high (low-motivation contrast) and the difference between medium and 
high (high-motivation contrast). A third variable was coded to represent the difference 
between the no-hint and hint conditions.  
To exclude  interpretations of the effects of the motivation instructions as being 
other than motivational, we analyzed effects of the these instructions on state anxiety and 
interest and found no significant effects on these variables. R2 on state anxiety was .018 
(F(5, 459) = 1.69, p = .135). R2 on interest was .002 (F(5, 458) = .158, p = .98). 
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Hypothesis 1: The Interaction Between A–E Styles, Search Constraints (Hints), and 
Motivation 
The first interaction hypothesis involved the A–E styles and the two types of 
experimental conditions: the motivation instructions and the hint–no hint conditions. We 
anticipated decreased performance for Explorers and increased performance for 
Assimilators as a consequence of increased motivation in the no-hint condition. We 
expected the opposite performance pattern in the hint condition. The hypothesis of the 
interaction between the motivation conditions, the A–E styles, and the hint–no hint 
conditions was tested using hierarchical regression analysis (Aiken & West, 1991; Cohen 
& Cohen, 1983; Pedhazur, 1982). Scores on the A–E scale were centered. 
____________________________ 
Insert Table 3 about here 
____________________________ 
As shown in Table 3, the results of this interaction analysis were significant. The 
results also showed that it was the contrast between the low-motivation condition and 
the other two motivation conditions that had the more important impact on the significant 
interaction. The pattern of the interaction can be seen in Figure 1, and supported 
Hypothesis 1. 
___________________________________ 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
___________________________________ 
Figure 1 shows that in the hint condition, Assimilators had an overall decrease in 
performance as a consequence of the motivation-arousing conditions, while Explorers 
had an overall increase in performance because of the motivation conditions. In the no-
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hint condition, this pattern of interaction was opposite to the pattern of interaction in the 
hint condition: When their motivation increased, Explorers increased their performance, 
while Assimilators decreased their performance when motivation increased. 
As a further test of the interaction, controlling for cognitive abilities and gender 
in research involving insight and cognitive styles was important. Consequently, the test 
of the posited interaction was also carried out when gender and the two measures of 
intelligence were first entered in hierarchical regression analysis. The interaction 
involving the experimental conditions and the A–E styles was still significant.  
Finally, to more formally test the slopes in the significant interaction, simple 
slope analyses were carried out within the hints and no-hint conditions, and the contrast 
between the low motivation and mean of the other two motivation conditions was used 
as a predictor, while the A-E style dimension was the moderator. Supporting the present 
hypothesis, the slopes for motivation were negative and significant for Explorers (higher 
scores on the A–E inventory) at two standard deviations above the mean on the A–E 
inventory (simple slope = -.94, SE = .473, t (230) = 1.985, p = .04 (one-tailed)) in the no-
hint condition. For Assimilators, the slopes for motivation were positive and significant 
at one standard deviation below the mean (simple slope = .488, SE = .226, t (230) = 2.39, 
p = .016 (one-tailed)) on the A–E inventory. In the hint condition, the motivation slopes 
for Explorers were positive at two standard deviations above the mean (simple slope = 
.57, SE = .317, t (226) = 1.805, p = .036 (one-tailed)). For Assimilators, the motivation 
slopes were negative and significant at one standard deviation below the mean (simple 
slope = -.527, SE = .201, t (226) = 2.62, p = .004 (one-tailed)). These findings supported 
the hypotheses formulated in the introduction, and our previous studies. 
An Integrated Perspective on Insight  29 
 
 
Hypothesis 2: Interaction Between Previous Experience, A–E Styles, and 
Motivation 
To test the second hypothesis, we replaced the hint–no hint variable in the 
analyses above with the other search constraint, prior experience. In all other ways the 
data were coded and analyzed as described above. Scores on the A–E inventory and prior 
problem-solving experience were centered. 
______________________________________ 
Table 4 
______________________________________ 
As can be seen in Table 4, the results from hierarchical regression analysis also 
showed that this interaction was significant. In this test it was the combined effect of the 
low- and high-motivation contrasts that created the significant interaction, while each of 
them alone was  significant only in one-tailed tests. When gender, vocabulary, and 
number series were included in the analysis, the interaction was relatively unaffected. 
The pattern of interaction can be seen in Figure 2. 
___________________________________ 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
___________________________________ 
As seen in Figure 2, the pattern of this interaction was generally in 
correspondence with the interaction including the hint–no hint variable analyzed above. 
However, in Figure 2 the slope for Assimilators was flatter instead of decreasing, because 
of the motivation instructions when the subjects have higher levels of experience. This 
deviation from the expected pattern may have been caused by the increased task structure 
due to the solution hints that half the sample received. Still, performance increased more 
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for Explorers than for Assimilators as a consequence of increased motivation when the 
level of experience was very high. There were no higher-order interactions involving 
experience, the hint–no hint conditions, the A–E styles, and the motivation instructions. 
 Simple slope analyses were then conducted, and simple slopes were calculated at 
two standard deviations above and below the means on the A–E scale and the measure 
of experience. Thus, the hypothesis was tested focusing on extreme scorers, an approach 
that can be necessary to overcome the frequently encountered low-power problems 
associated with interaction analysis (see Aguinis, 2004). In these analyses it turned out 
that the slope for the low motivation contrast was positive and significant for Explorers 
with a high level of experience (simple slope (1) = 1.115, SE = .512, t (442) = 2.178, p = 
.015 (one-tailed)), while the simple slope for the high-motivation contrast was not 
significant. This means that under conditions of lower competence in utilizing internal 
search constraints, and where internal task constraints were available, increased 
motivation had a positive and significant effect upon performance. 
Stronger motivation seemed to not have any additional effect on performance. 
When analyzing simple slopes for Explorers with low levels of experience, the simple 
slope for the low- and high-motivation contrasts were both negative and significant 
(simple slope (1) = -1.072, SE = .545, t (442) = 1.968, p = .025 (one-tailed); simple slope 
(2) = -.789, SE = .454, t (442) = 1.736, p = .042 (one-tailed)). This implies that under 
conditions of low levels of prior experience, which theoretically represent optimal 
conditions for the Explorer type of competence, increased motivation led to lower levels 
of performance. 
When simple slope analyses were carried out for Assimilators with high levels of 
prior experience, the simple slope for the low-motivation contrast was negative but not 
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significant, while the simple slope for the high-motivation contrast was negative and 
significant (simple slope (2) = -.992, SE = .504, t (442) = 1.969, p = .025 (one-tailed)). 
This means that high levels of motivation impaired performance for Assimilators when 
the level of prior experience was high. In other words, increased motivation had a 
negative effect when competence in utilizing search constraints was high and internal 
search constraints were present.  
Finally, simple slopes were analyzed for Assimilators with low levels of 
experience. While the slopes for the two motivation contrasts were both positive, they 
were not significant in these analyses, although there was a tendency toward significance 
for the first contrast (p = .063). 
To explore the three-way interaction between experience, styles, and motive 
instructions further, we used the data from the three no-hint motivation conditions since 
these conditions were unaffected by the external search constraints (hints). The results 
showed that the interaction was significant at the 10% level. Inspection of the pattern of 
this interaction showed that the interaction now corresponded more closely with the one 
including the hint–no hint variable, with decreasing performance for Assimilators due to 
increasing motivation under the condition of higher levels of experience. 
Discussion 
In this study, the theory of A–E cognitive styles (Kaufmann, 1979, 1995; 
Martinsen, 1995b; Martinsen & Kaufmann, 2000) was integrated with classic 
conceptualizations of achievement motivation and optimal motivation for the task 
(Atkinson, 1974a, b), and with information processing theory where solution search in 
large problem spaces and availability of search constraints play prominent roles (Kaplan 
& Simon, 1990). Central conceptions in this integration were that the cognitive style 
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distinction in question describes heuristic competencies related to the utility of search 
constraints in problem-solving tasks and that these types of competencies have 
motivational implications that interact with other types of motivational determinants. We 
also emphasized the hypothesis of optimal motivation for the task, stating that different 
types of tasks may be better solved with different levels of aroused resultant motivation. 
We based our predictions on this theory and tested two hypotheses; one included solution 
hints as a search constraint and the other included prior problem-solving experience as a 
search constraint. 
When considering the two significant three-way interactions, it can be concluded 
that the results provided strong support for the theory. The interactions were also 
significant when important control variables were included. It was primarily the contrast 
between the control condition and the average of the two other motivation conditions 
that was significant when solution hints were used as search constraints. This contrast 
can be interpreted as describing an increase from a low-level to an elevated motivational 
state. Consequently, it seems well supported that the A–E styles describe different kinds 
of heuristic competencies in utilizing search constraints and that these competencies have 
motivational implications and interact with motive strength and search constraints in a 
predictable way. The present findings replicated and extended the findings from previous 
studies (Kaufmann & Martinsen, 2006; Martinsen, 1993, 1994, 1995; Martinsen & 
Furnham, 2015), where different tasks, samples, and designs were used. Thus, it seems 
that there is a complex and dynamic interplay between individual differences in cognitive 
style, motivational processes, and the effectiveness of search constraints in insight. In 
future studies of insight, it may be usefull to control for the influence of the A–E styles 
describing important heuristics or competencies, with implications for the effectiveness 
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of search constraints in insight. Moreover, it seems equally important to control for 
motivational influences since these seem to moderate the effectiveness of both cognitive 
styles and search constraints. 
Beyond these considerations, we admittedly did not have a formal account of the 
mechanisms involved in too-high motivation for the task, and further research is 
necessary to shed light on this issue. However, from the pattern of findings in the two 
interactions, it seems that increased motivation may push people from a primary mode 
of information processing associated with their style disposition to a secondary mode of 
processing associated with the other style disposition. 
Limitations 
While our previous studies on the present issue have been based on measured 
motives, this study emphasized experimental achievement manipulations. We may, of 
course, ask whether these had the intended effects since we included no direct measure 
of total resultant motivation. To measure resultant motivation seems usually not done in 
this field. Despite this, our motivation manipulations were based on a long tradition of 
research, and were designed to vary the level of achievement needs for participants in 
the three experimental motivation groups. Our reasoning was based on McClelland et 
al.’s (1953) theory and findings, similar findings by French (1955), and a study by Smith 
(1966). On the basis of TAT pictures, McClelland et al. (1953) found that achievement 
instructions increased the level of achievement imagery. French (1955) also found that 
ego-involving instructions increased the level of need for achievement scores in her test 
on insight. On the other hand, Smith (1966) did not find any significant effects on need 
for achievement from a set of experimental instructions, but found that achievement and 
An Integrated Perspective on Insight  34 
 
 
multi-incentive instructions increased the mean level of performance on arithmetic tasks 
compared with the mean level of performance in a relaxed condition. 
In line with results from studies like these, Atkinson and Birch (1974) argued that 
the overall level of motivation could be increased using achievement instructions like the 
ones that we have presently used. However, there was also the alternative hypothesis that 
expectancy of evaluation and salient time constraints, both of which are part of 
achievement instructions, may arouse test anxiety (Hagtvet, 1989),  which in turn inhibits 
performance.  On the basis of this possibility, the expectation that the experimental 
motive manipulations in our study would differentially increase the level of aroused 
motivation should not be taken for granted, although the main trends in previous 
evidence have pointed in that direction. When investigating this possibility, however, we 
found no evidence supporting the idea that state anxiety scores would be differentially 
affected by the six conditions. 
Although the A-E style construct is measured by means of a self-report inventory, 
assumedly with the same limitations that have been associated with self-report in general 
(Butcher, Bubany, & Mason, 2013), the present findings nevertheless were in line with 
predictions and supported our theory. It can also be noted that while the style construct 
itself has been questioned in previous research (McKenna, 1984; Von Wittich & 
Antonakis, 2011) we believe that the present findings add to to the A-E style construct’s 
validity. 
Conclusion 
 On basis of the present findings, it seems beneficial for our understanding of 
insight to integrate individual differences in cognitive style and achievement motivation 
theory with information processing theory.  
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Table 1. Illustrative example on resultant motivation estimation for insight problems based on the simplified formula for achievement motivation 
and where task environment characteristics and cognitive style implications have been added to the theory/resultant motivation eqation. In this table 
we have included characteristics of the task environment (availability of search constraints), scores on the A–E inventory, probability of success 
based on high/low style scores (PsCs), incentive value of success (1 - PsCs), the product of PsCs and incentive value (competence motivation), and 
resultant motivation using the values of 1, 2, and 3 (figures chosen to keep resultant motivation in the .00–1.00 range) to describe low, medium, and 
high levels for motive strength (Ms - Mf). We assumed an optimal level of motivation when task constraints were not available to be .25 and .40 
when task constraints were available (implying that task complexity became somewhat lower and tasks a little easier). We modeled the positive main 
effect of search constraints by adding .10 to the Ps values in the condition with available search constraints.  
 
Insight problem 
task 
environment 
(Tc) 
Style (high 
and low 
scores; 
Assimilator/ 
Explorer) 
PsCs (1 - PsCs)  
Incentive 
value 
Competence 
motivation: 
Ps * (1 - Ps) 
Resultant motivation 
dependent on motive 
strength (1, 2, and 3 * 
(PsCs * (1-PsCs)) 
Assumed 
optimal 
motivation 
Performance dependent on 
motive strength (1, 2, 3) * 
competence motivation 
 
No search 
constraints 
available (high-
novelty 
condition) 
Assimilator .10 .90 .09 .09, .18, .27 .25 Low, better, high 
Explorer .30 .70 .21 .21, .42, .63 .25 High, lower, low 
 
Search constraints 
available 
(increased-
familiarity 
condition) 
Assimilator .40 .60 .24 .24, .48, .72 .40 Low, better, low 
Explorer .20 .80 .16 .16, .32, .48 .40 Low, better, high 
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Table 2 
 
Correlations, Means, and Standard Deviations for Study Variables 
 
 M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Gender  - -           
2. Vocabulary 17.29 3.95 .067          
3. Number series 13.73 3.88 .312** .276**         
4. Hint–no hint  - - -.049 .028 .012        
5. First contrast (low vs. the other 
two) 
- - 
.023 .006 .011 -.007       
6. Second contrast (medium vs. 
high) 
- - 
.019 -.023 -.027 .002 -.013      
7. A–E styles 101.7 16.28 .125** .036 .029 .014 -.048 -.032     
8. Experience 6.8 2.96 .045 -.056 .016 -.016 .027 -.033 .108*    
9. Interest 22.48 7.05 -.033 .034 .007 -.024 -.014 .015 .034 -.001   
10. State anxiety 18.9 5.86 -.312** -.116* -.169** -.103* .053 .050 -.161** -.104* .020  
11. Insight performance 2.89 1.68 .228** .197** .217** .237** -.025 -.079 .092* .115* -.033 -.256** 
Note. ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed). (C) = Centered variable. N = 459–468. For gender, 
females = 1, males = 2. For hint–no hint, no hints = 1, hints = 2. 
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Table 3 
Summary of hierarchical regression analysis of the A–E styles (centered), the two 
contrasts for the experimental motivation contrasts, and solution hints. First contrast 
was difference between low motivation and the other motivation conditions. Second 
contrast was between medium and high motivation. The dependent variable was 
performance on insight tasks. N = 463. 
 
Variable Step 1 Step 2 
First contrast -.013 -.008 
Second contrast -.079 -.077 
Hints .229**   .235** 
AE .093* .101* 
Low motivation contrast * 
hints 
-.056 -.062 
High motivation contrast * 
hints 
.037 .041 
Low motivation contrast * AE .003 .003 
High motivation contrast * AE .014 .013 
Hints * AE .036 .045 
Low mot. contr * hints * AE  .156** 
High mot. contr. * hints * AE  -.020 
R2 .073 .098 
R2 increment  .025** 
F 3.992** 4.468** 
Note: * p<.05. **p<.01 
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Table 4 
Summary of hierarchical regression analysis of the experimental motivation contrasts, 
the A–E styles (centered), and prior problem-solving experience (centered). First 
contrast was difference between low motivation and the other motivation conditions. 
Second contrast was between medium and high motivation. The dependent variable 
was performance on insight tasks. N = 454. 
 
Variable Step 1 Step 2 
Low motivation contrast -.027 -.041 
High motivation contrast -.075 -.079 
AE .096* .100* 
Low motivation contrast * AE .015 .026 
High motivation contrast * AE .009 .014 
Prior experience .122* .142* 
Low motivation contrast * prior exp. .063 .054 
High motivation contrast * prior exp. -.006 -.012 
AE * prior exp. -.076 -.070 
Low mot. contr * AE * prior exp.  .088+ 
High mot. contr * AE * prior exp.  .098+ 
R2 .041 054 
R2 increment  .013* 
F 2.09* 2.29 
Note: + p<.05 (one-tailed). * p<.05 (two-tailed). **p<.01 (two-tailed). 
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Figure captions: 
Figure 1. Interaction plot of A–E * motivation instructions in the hint and no-hint 
conditions. The plot points for the A–E styles are at one standard deviation above and 
below the mean.  
Figure 2. Interaction plots of the A–E styles * motivation instructions at four levels of 
experience. The plot points for the A–E styles are at one standard deviation above and 
below the mean. For experience, the plot points are at one and two standard deviations 
above and below the mean. 
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